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Cultural background / radio play

Editor: Karin Beindorff

Dossier: The Abduction Legend or how Eichmann came to Jerusalem?

Gaby Weber

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Atmo: Radio announcement in English and German. Discussion begins.

Author:

April 1961. In Jerusalem, the trial of SS Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Eichmann, the Organizer of the deportations to Nazi death camps, began. This dominated the headlines of the world's public for months.

Almost a year before, on 11 May 1960, the Israeli Foreign Intelligence Service had kidnapped Eichmann from his hideout in Buenos Aires. Three of these Mossad agents, among them their chief, Isser Harel, wrote books on their "heroic deeds". Today, the world's press repeats their version. But it has long been known that Eichmann's hideout had already been leaked at the beginning of the 50s. What lies behind the legends about this abduction and trial? Do they really only have to do with the crimes of National Socialism? Was not perhaps Hans Globke, Chancellor Adenauer's right-hand man and commentator of the Nuremberg

Race Laws, involved? What were the relationships at the time of the Eichmann trial between Chancellor Adenauer and Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion? What role did the most important intelligence services of the Cold War, the CIA and the KGB, play in this? Why many documents are in this case still kept secret? And might there perhaps even be a military link?

For years I have been driven to seek answers to these questions in both interviews and archives. Finally, after taking the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)—the German Intelligence Agency, to court, they finally had to grant me some insight, albeit partial, into all of this.

Announcement:

The Abduction Legend or how Eichmann came to Jerusalem?
A feature by Gaby Weber

Speaker:

Adolf Eichmann grew up in Linz. By June 1933, he worked for the Vacuum Oil Company, which belonged to the Rockefeller-empire. Then he moved to Nazi Germany and became "an expert on Jewish affairs" with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the Security Service of the SS. In 1938 he headed the "Central Office for Jewish Emigration" in Vienna. And in January 1942, he wrote the minutes for the "Wannsee Conference", on which the "Final Solution" of the Jewish question was decided. Eichmann then took over its administrative implementation. After 1945, he went into hiding until 1950, when he was able to travel on the so-called "rat line" to Argentina, with the help of the Vatican.

Author:

Until this moment, the story is undisputed. What happened next has received hardly any attention. Historians have so far scarcely touched the matter of these Nazi exiles and the laundering of the so-called 'Nazi gold'. Thousands of Nazis stayed on in Argentina,

up to a total of 50,000 has been mentioned. However, they only planned to stay until 1965 since the statute of limitations was, at that time, twenty years. They were not only tolerated in South America, but even courted.

Speaker:

Adolf Eichmann began by working on the tunnel under the Paraná River, a major project with the German company Hochtief, subsequently on a power plant with Siemens, and from 1959 he was with Mercedes Benz.

Author:

The Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón was hoping on receiving technological expertise from these German Refugees. And the branches of the German companies involved - most notably Daimler-Benz - were able to live high on the hog on the Rio de la Plata with the hidden capital they had siphoned away during the Second World War.

Speaker:

The Cold War was also in full swing on the South American continent. The Secret services of both East and West were watching the operations of the "brown exiles" very closely.

Author

But no one, apparently, wanted to bring these people to justice. The German Federal Intelligence Agency (BND) had former Nazi Army officers working at all levels. And the Western services, and even the KGB, were also happy to use the old comrades for their own spy networks.

I was able to discover some notes on this nest of Nazi spies in the files of the BND. German foreign intelligence possessed in Argentina, and I quote, "many good connections," informants, undercover agents, and sources. US-Services also had their

informants, one of whom was the war criminal Willem Sassen.

The CIA had known about the whereabouts of Adolf Eichmann since 1954. However they had no interest in arresting him. At least, not in 1954. Four years later - on 19 March 1958 - the BND once again informed the CIA about his location and aliases. Eichmann had now fallen into the crosshairs. Exactly when his contacts with Soviet Intelligence began is not clear from BND files. It was probably when his brown associates made contact with the Ministry for State Security of the GDR in the late 1950's.

Speaker:

Beginning in 1956, Adolf Eichmann reluctantly agreed to interviews for the purpose of writing down his memoirs. The rights to these interviews, which dragged on for two years, were reserved for Eberhard Fritsch and Willem Sassen. In Argentina, Fritsch was editor of the Nazi paper "Der Weg" (The Way). The German prosecutor in Lüneburg started a penal investigation against Fritsch for "subversion". The German Internal Intelligence Service (Verfassungsschutz) also began watching Fritsch during his visits to Germany. Quoting from BND files:

Citation:

"Fritsch is offering the Eichmann material to German offices for DM 80,000 to DM 100,000. He has shown a reliable agent photo copies of some sample sheets."

Speaker:

A leading figure of the Nazi exile was Hans-Ulrich Rudel, a highly decorated aviator and Stuka pilot of the Second World War, and founder of the "Freikorps" (Free Corps) in Germany, which was equally opposed to Communism and to the integration of the young Bonn republic into NATO. In 1953, the Freikorps was outlawed following pressure from U.S. authorities. According to the BND, Rudel had established contacts with East Berlin:

Citation:

"On his last visit to Germany, Sassen made contact with Rudel, and there are persistent reports that his political activity is under the influence of Pankow. It has been confirmed that Sassen was in Leipzig and Dresden".

Speaker:

The Dutch SS officer Willem Sassen had received the death penalty in Belgium, and had been condemned to twenty years in his home country. However, this latter verdict is mysteriously missing from the files of the National Archives in Amsterdam.

Citation:

"... we have no idea how this could happen "...

Author:

... the archivist told me, at my request.

Speaker:

Sassen was jailed at war's end but broke out twice. He ended up in Buenos Aires with false papers, and wrote for LIFE and for DER STERN. He also filed regular reports at the U.S. Embassy.

Citation:

"Sassen is thought to be playing both sides of the fence. He is suspected of working both for "Gehlen" and for the Americans. Up to this time he has no official passport. He claims that he is working for a German organization about which he could say nothing. It is led by a prominent German General whose name begins with G. He has recently (1959) been in East Germany. In contrast to an earlier period Sassen has ample funds."

Speaker:

Although the Netherlands only took his name off the wanted list 1969, Sassen received a West German passport in January 1959. Why? - the Foreign Office later wanted to clarify this. But the BND would not give out this information, only replying laconically:

Citation:

"We have no knowledge here on the question of the nationality of Sassen."

Speaker:

The German Internal Intelligence Service did indicate that Sassen was a member of the Waffen-SS. But:

Citation:

"He was not a member of any other national-socialist organizations, according to a DC Extract."

Author:

DC here means "Document Center", then still under U.S. administration in West Berlin. How this repeatedly condemned war criminal came to have a pleasant file [at the DC] is as strange as the issue of his West German citizenship.

Speaker:

An undercover agent of the BND reported on the discussions between Sassen and Eichmann.

Citation:

"As of the beginning of 56 Eichmann had reluctantly been persuaded to write down his memoirs. This material had an initial size of 3000 pages. However, on revision it ended up as 800 DIN-A-4 pages. This was the version that was being offered."

Author:

The entire 3,000 pages are probably in the archives of the secret

services. There are fragments of these in the Federal Archives in Koblenz, after being censored and passed through several hands. They almost completely exclude the post-1945 period. The name of the Commentator of the Nuremberg Race Laws, Adenauer's Secretary of State Globke, is barely mentioned. In the BND files on the other hand, there are numerous indications that, in the original version, Eichmann had extensively expounded on Hans Globke's participation in the extermination of the Jews.

Citation:

"Statements about an alleged correspondence between the Governor General (Poland) Hans Frank and Globke about the "too soft and indecisive attitude" of Eichmann. As part of the final solution the Nuremberg Laws should serve as the basis. The main sections of the material definitely deal with Globke and with many other leading figures in the Federal Republic."

Author:

Three strands run through the matter of Eichmann, his abduction and trial. Plot number one concerns Adenauer's Secretary of State Hans Globke, against whom the Frankfurt Prosecutor General Fritz Bauer would weigh in on, and for whom Eichmann was a threat. Bauer was a Jew, a Social Democrat and Antifascist. In the anti-Communist climate of the Cold War such people were looked upon with suspicion. The vast majority were strictly against any elucidation of German crimes. Plot number two concerns the Israeli interest in their own secret, nuclear program. And Plot number three deals with the Allied summit of 16 May 1960 in Paris, where the future of Berlin and the division of Germany would be discussed. High-ranking ex-Nazis tried to re-enter the fray through their own contacts with the intelligence agencies on both sides of the Cold War.

Speaker:

As Ministerial Advisor to the Reich Interior Ministry, Hans Globke

had arranged that his 'Commentary on the Racial Laws' would also be "applied" against the Jews of the countries under occupation by the Wehrmacht. These people were deported to the death camps, and their property confiscated.

On 11 February 1959 the "Neue Rhein Zeitung" reported that Globke played a role in the "Merten Affair." In April 57, the Berlin lawyer Max Merten, once Military Council Agent (Militärverwaltungsrat) in Thessaloniki, was arrested in Athens and indicted there for war crimes.

In 1959 the military process in Athens was inaugurated. Merten explained that in February 1943 he had warned Jews he had known, about their imminent deportation. He had elaborated a rescue plan with the help of the Representative of the International Red Cross, René Burkhardt. Ten thousand Jewish women should have been transported to Palestine on ships of the Red Cross that were at anchor in the port bringing food. At Burkhardt's request he had sent a telegram to Geneva. The German Embassy thereupon expelled the Red Cross man from the country. However he could not reconcile himself with the failure of the rescue plan, and travelled to see Eichmann in Berlin. Merten testified:

Citation:

"Eichmann thought that the plan for the emigration to Palestine required the agreement of Globke, and told this idea of the Red Cross to Globke by telephone. He received a sharp rebuttal from him, as I heard. Upon completion of the call Eichmann (ran) back and forth in his modest office like an injured bull, complaining bitterly about "stupid bureaucratic idiots," as he put it."-

Speaker:

Merten presented evidence: the telegram to the Red Cross in Geneva, and Burkhardt also confirmed the rescue plan to the

Court. Merten had indeed helped him in this.

Author:

But in spite of all exoneration — Merten was sentenced as a war criminal to 25 years imprisonment. This example could have set a precedent, and German Diplomacy pulled out all stops to prevent this. A few months after this judgement, Merten was transferred to Germany. How this was "manipulated" was outlined by Gustav von Schmoller in this manner during his examination of witnesses:

Citation

"When Prime Minister (Constantinos) Karamanlis came on a state visit to Bonn, during which the economic assistance of the Federal Republic for the Industrialization of Greece was to be discussed, Chancellor Adenauer informed him that the matter (of Merten) had him very worried. Karamanlis promised him every effort would be made to clean the matter up. And on the return flight to Athens he decided, with no further ado, to have Merten transferred back to Germany."

Author:

The Adenauer government paid. First, a loan assistance of 200 million marks, then follow-up financing of 100 million and "technical assistance" of fifteen million.

Speaker:

When Merten and Attorney General Fritz Bauer first met, is not clear from what is contained in the prosecutor 's files. It is thought to be "spring 1960". Bauer had been investigating State Secretary Globke, Adenauer's right hand man, for some time. Merten's arrival was just what he needed. For Bauer was aware that Globke's offences were about to lapse (for Statute of Limitations reasons).

Author:

Mertens statement alone would hardly be sufficient for an indictment against Globke. Bauer needed an additional witness, and that could be Eichmann. The Attorney General had known of Eichmann's residence in Argentina since 1957. He had tried several times, in vain, to get the Israeli authorities to intervene. And when Eichmann appeared in Israel as a prisoner on the 23rd of May, 1960, Bauer at last thought he had his star witness against Globke.

Speaker:

The main goal on the political agenda of the Israeli government at that time was: an atomic bomb. The U.S. did not wish to help since their Laws prohibited the manufacture of nuclear weapons for other states.

Ben Gurion thus first asked the French for help. And they offered a commitment for the construction of the Dimona reactor in the Negev desert. But U.S. President Eisenhower exerted pressure on Paris, and Charles De Gaulle had to back down. Instead, he brought the West Germans into play.

Author:

Would Bonn, after all that Germany had done to the European Jews, be able to reject the wishes of Jerusalem?

Speaker:

In December 1959, a high-level delegation of German Nuclear scientists, including Otto Hahn, President of the Max Planck Society in Göttingen, and nuclear physicist Wolfgang Gentner, travelled to the Israeli Weizmann Institute. Both had worked on the "Wonder-weapon" (Wunderwaffe) in Hitler's "Uranium Group" (Uranverein). And four months later, the Cabinet granted three million marks from the budget of the Atomic Energy Ministry, for nuclear cooperation with Israel. The Raw material - uranium - was sourced in Argentina, who gave a total of 116 tons of so-called "yellow cake" to Israel. Now only the

money needed to build the nuclear reactor itself had to be found.

On 14 March 1960, two months before the kidnapping of Eichmann from Buenos Aires, Adenauer and Ben Gurion met in New York. It was a harmonious meeting, wrote the press—a breakthrough to almost "normal" diplomatic relations. The mass murder of the Jews was fifteen years ago, in 1952 the "Reconciliation Agreement" had been completed—destitute Jewish refugees in Israel would be helped to the tune of 3.5 billion DM.

Author:

Adenauer and Ben Gurion agreed in New York to: "Operation Business Friend" (Aktion Geschäftsfreund).

Speaker:

Excerpt from a memo from Karl Carstens, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office.

Citation:

"During the meeting of the Chancellor with Mr. Ben-Gurion in New York, was discussed the matter of German development aid to Israel. The Chancellor agreed to Development Assistance, on a commercial basis, in the form of a loan of DM 200 million per year pledged over ten years. Other meetings between the Chancellor, Minister Erhard, and State Secretary Globke were conducted, and these concluded with an understanding whereby the first portion of this year's allocation, namely 85 million DM, would be released in June and July."

Author:

The payment was for a "development project in the Negev desert." There, the Dimona Nuclear Plant was under construction, including its hidden underground facilities. Karl Carstens noted in Bonn:

Citation:

"Federal (Defence) Minister (Franz-Josef) Strauss met Ben Gurion a few days ago. Ben Gurion came to raise the subject of the production of nuclear weapons."

Speaker:

The Foreign Office was opposed to the financing of the Israeli nuclear weapon.

Citation:

"The Israeli government still intended to use the forthcoming economic negotiations primarily to secure financial support for the proposed desalination plant for atomic purposes. This project has been the subject of ongoing negotiations with the U.S. government for some time. (...) The (German) Federal Government has made scientific equipment for research work in the field of nuclear energy, available to the Nuclear Physics Department of the Weizmann Institute in Jerusalem. (...) Any help we provide for an atomic project should, on no account, be used for military purposes. However, this Department (Foreign Office) is not in a position to judge how this might be prevented."

Author:

Carstens feared a deterioration of German-Arab relations if the deal was announced. And this was the case, even before the first payment:

Citation:

"The Ambassador of the United Arab Republic looked me up to ask if it were true that the FRG in Israel was building a reactor. I answered his question in the negative."

Author:

But Adenauer and his right hand man Globke won the day. They

negotiated only about details. And exactly at that time—23 May 1960, another bombshell burst: the news went around the world that Eichmann, the organizer of the murder of 6 million Jews, was sitting in an Israeli prison. The BND was flabbergasted, Adenauer and Globke raged about. Weren't they just recently sitting peacefully together with Ben Gurion—and now THIS! What would Eichmann say in his defence? Would he characterize himself as a transmitter of superior orders, and constitute a huge danger for Hans Globke, Adenauer's right hand?

Speaker:

The "Action Business Friend" was suspended. Banker Hermann Josef Abs, member of the board of Deutsche Bank and of the Supervisory Board of IG Farben in the Nazi era, raised concerns.

Citation:

"The magnitude of these wishes of Israel (are) are extremely high."

Speaker:

Attorney General Bauer now opened an investigation against Hans Globke, and the GDR began a campaign.

Speaker:

The BND began gathering spy reports from around the world on the forthcoming [Eichmann] trial and its possible revelations:

Citation:

"A source reports that major (Argentina) military figures, including the Commander in Chief, regard Eichmann as a double agent in the employ of both Germany and Israel. This explains his excellent relationships with respected members of the Jewish community in Argentina. Extensive information will be found in his possession. Eichmann will no doubt put this sound knowledge of

prominent former Nazis to good account during the forthcoming hearings."

Speaker:

The BND sent the 'journalist' Rolf Vogel, son of a Jewish mother, to Jerusalem. There he spoke with Prime Minister Ben Gurion and handed him his Book "Israel, State of Hope".

Author:

Vogel introduced himself to Werner Pfromm, the Bonn Public Prosecutor, as a "first degree half-breed" (Mischling ersten Grades). Pfromm had once served as a high Nazi officer, and had come once again to high honours as a lawyer in the services of the Federal Government. It was precisely to him that Fritz Bauer would need to hand over his case against Globke.

Speaker:

The journalist Rolf Vogel about his talks with Ben-Gurion:

Citation:

"The conversation turned to the press attacks against Secretary of State Globke. Ben Gurion took pains to assure that he had knowledge that Eichmann had expressed to his defence counsel: "Globke, who is that? I have never heard the name. I do not know him". Ben Gurion repeated this several times. He explained that Eichmann's statement was reported by the soldiers who had been present at the initial hearings with his counsel. The sympathies of the Prime Minister and his entourage regarding the attacks in the press (are) entirely on the side of Globke."

Speaker:

One should not, however, according to Vogel, exploit the words of the soldier for public purposes.

Citation:

"I rather have the feeling they are counting on Servatius (the defence lawyer) to bring the final clarification on this point."

Author:

This is what happened. Eichmann's defence counsel wrote to the prosecutor without being asked:

Citation:

"My client has authorized me to declare that Globke is unknown to him, and that he cannot recall having spoken to him at any time. On the question of the Merten incident, he cannot remember anything concerning the action to rescue Jews from Salonika."

Author:

Ben Gurion had fulfilled his part of the bargain. He had prevented an International Tribunal and had shut his prisoner down. In court, Eichmann claimed he did not know Globke, and was silent about all other critical events during and after the war. Neither did the details of the Sassen interviews ever surface. Parts were sold to the press, and CIA Director Allen Dulles personally ensured that Globke's name did not appear in them.

Speaker:

It was only during the Revision process when Eichmann was already under sentence of death, that he raised the question of Globke.

Speaker:

The judge refused, on procedural grounds, to issue Hans Globke with a summons. Nothing now stood in the way for the payment for the Israeli nuclear program, noted the Foreign Secretary on 25 August 1961.

Citation:

"Payments are to follow only after the end of the Eichmann trial, this being understood to mean the completion of the whole trial process, not just the actual verdict. The Eichmann Trial is due to be fully complete on the 14th of this month. A week later Secretary of State Globke will thus confirm that the conditions for the loan commitment have been fulfilled." (see *this document on www.gabyweber.com*)

Speaker:

Overall, the state-owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (the KfW) paid out 630 Million DM.

Author:

KfW confirmed this payment, but claimed they no longer had a single document in their possession. When I asked whether interest was levied on this "loan" and whether it had been repaid, it replied:

Citation:

"As a Federal Bank, the KfW winds down its order book of projects such as those of "Action Business Friend" (Aktion Geschäftsfreund) that you requested. (We respectfully ask) for your understanding that we cannot speak about such transactions in public."

Speaker:

Details on the German-Israeli "Action Business Friend" are to be found at the Foreign Office. On the 31st of October 1961 the KfW sent them the draft Loan Agreement with the "Industrial Development Bank of Israel". In the interim, Eichmann had denied any mention of Globke before the court. The first instalment of 85 Million D-mark was to be used for "infrastructure projects and industrial development". The interest rate of between four and five-and-a-half percent was to be repaid over eight years.

Author:

The original agreement was for a "credit on a commercial basis," but, in the following exchange of letters, this had morphed into "government assistance". "The term 'commercial basis'," as per the letters, was only "chosen for camouflage purposes." The word "extortion" is not mentioned by the Foreign Office. However, the "Action Business Friend" had nothing in common with an ordinary treaty between two governments.

Citation:

"No clear documentation exists on the discussions between Chancellor Adenauer and Ben Gurion. Although the partners did indeed acknowledge the content of discussion in letters, and how they had understood it, confirmation from the German side is not available. The letter of the foreign party is reported to be in the hands of Herr Abs. The legal position gives rise to a number of doubts. Under Constitutional Law the German Chancellor may not be in a position to enter into ten-year financial commitments without Cabinet [approval], and in particular without [the approval of] the Finance Minister and of Parliament. I also do not believe that the Chancellor had understood the discussion in this manner. Furthermore, there is no mutually accepted representation of the content of these discussions."

Speaker:

The U.S. government was against re-armament in the Middle East in the fifties, and to the spread of nuclear weapons. As early as July '63 President John F. Kennedy had, in writing, called on the Israeli Prime Minister to have the Dimona complex in the Negev inspected. Five months previously, in February '63, the Argentine government had decided to supply 100 tons of uranium to Israel. Karl Carstens of the Bonn Foreign Office noted in September:

Citation:

"The Secretary of State (...) was able to tell me in strict confidence that, by an absolutely reliable method, President Kennedy has learned of the measures taken by us. The information had been deliberately limited to his person. From the intimations of the State Secretary, I understand that the Israelis have adopted the information."

Author:

What Kennedy thought of the German financing of Dimona is not known. In November '63 he was shot, and the next U.S. presidents did not officially raise any further objections to the Israeli atom bomb. It is also not known what might have motivated Ben-Gurion to have turned Eichmann over to the Israeli trial judge without first informing his responsible German negotiating partner in atomic matters? Did the U.S. government put pressure on Ben Gurion, or promise him something "persuasive"? In any case the CIA knew, even before the Mossad, where Eichmann was be found.

Speaker:

A CIA document states:

Citation:

"The principal security branch involved in the capture was Shin Bet (Internal Secret). (It) took Eichmann into custody in mid-May. It was not until Eichmann was on route to Israel on an airplane between Buenos Aires and Dakar that Rosen (The Israeli Attorney General) was informed of the Shin Bet had stated that a "deal had been effected between the Government of Israel and Eichmann, the [latter being tired of hiding] and the former [needing] something to [offset] the serious [blow] to its prestige at home and abroad occasioned by the sale of arms to Federal Republic of Germany. However, according to Belchenko, the "capture" would also result in an increased budget for the security forces.

Speaker:

The CIA puts the word "capture" in quotation marks ...

Author:

But what interest had the U.S. government in Eichmann's capture? Where did he get in their way? Quote of the BND:

Citation:

"Eichmann had contacts with Soviet intelligence and was to be transferred at the same moment as Khrushchev was proposing that the SBZ (Soviet Occupation Zone = GDR) should abandon all co-operation with former National Socialist members. Eichmann has prepared a comprehensive roster of former Nazis currently in the service of Pankow, including 220 members of the East Zone KP (Communist Party), most importantly Trade Minister Merkel, Minister of Agriculture Reichelt, President of the Supreme Court of the GDR Schumann, and General Müller."

Speaker:

The note is dated 4 June 1960, shortly after Eichmann's arrest. The source is given as Intelligent Agent 5473, who refers this to "French Circles."

Author:

".. to be transferred at the same moment "The words 'same moment' refer to the Paris Summit in May 1960. But what the Soviets had meant by the word "transfer," (Überführung) and what exactly their plans for Eichmann were, are not known to this day.

Did the "transfer" have anything to do with those Russian nuclear-powered submarines that had been spotted in early February 1960 off the coast of Patagonia? For nine days they were bombed by the Argentine Navy. But of its eight cluster bombs half did not ignite, and the U-boats escaped. The U.S. Navy, which was called

in to help after a week, arrived too late. The Argentines were the "laughing stock of all navies of the world," according to a 'Memorandum for Major Eisenhower'.

Speaker:

In 1960, the division of Germany was not yet sealed. The Berlin Wall was only built in the following year. SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht had proposed all-German elections to Chancellor Adenauer in January 1960. There were two conditions: all of Germany was to be neutral, meaning no other military alliances. And this new state should be "de-nazified. This meant for Bonn, Hans Globke, Refugee Minister Theodor Oberlaender, and Transport Minister Hans-Christoph Seebohm. In East Berlin this meant the "220 members of the East Zone Communist Party.

O-Ton: "Pero la propuesta de la neutralidad

Speaker 1:

The German neutrality proposal made sense; it originated with Stalin. Germany had been responsible for the Second World War.

Speaker:

Isidoro Gilbert joined the Argentine Communist Party in 1948. He had been a correspondent for the Soviet news agency TASS for thirty years.

Speaker 1:

And the Soviet Union well knew that they could not support the GDR as economically as the Western powers could the Federal Republic with the Marshall Plan. In the long run the GDR would not be able to compete against West Germany, and the economic Development of the two German states would run very differently. But making Germany neutral meant to take away the United States' closest ally in Europe.

Speaker:

At the Paris Summit on 16th May, 1960, Khrushchev planned to propose a halt to all nuclear tests, to withdraw foreign forces from Central Europe, and to establish a nuclear-free zone, according to German Foreign Office files. NATO and the Warsaw Pact would sign a non-aggression pact. In case of refusal of his proposal, Khrushchev threatened to conclude a "Special Peace Treaty" with the GDR.

This meeting had been in preparation for months. And of course, the U.S. government knew about the Soviet proposal of a unified neutral Germany, with Berlin as a "free city".

Author:

Eisenhower would not or could not let that happen. He feared an extension of Soviet influence in Europe and wished to establish a nuclear weapons base closer to the Soviet border. He needed the Federal Republic as a bulwark for the Cold War. Furthermore, they shared a common anti-communist ideology. The U.S. President therefore was not bothered about people like Globke with a Nazi past.

The fact that these people could remain in Adenauer's cabinet was a clear indication that he had no interest in the proposals of the Kremlin—denazification in a united, neutral Germany.

For the Germans the reunification offer must have looked tempting. And the congregation of Nazi comrades in Argentina were in favour of this idea, and criticized the Bonn government as "traitors" and "slaves of the USA".

The State Department needed a West Germany which, without a peace treaty, was not sovereign and could be given orders.

Speaker:

Quote from a memorandum from the Chief of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission John McCone to a ministerial meeting with Britain, France and the Federal Republic:

Citation:

"It is the opinion of The Department of State that West Germany has concluded that, for political reasons, they would not wish to press for Germany's re-unification".

Author:

But how could U.S. President Eisenhower publicly reject reunification? Blame for the permanent division of Germany had to be born by Moscow alone. There could also be no official objection to Khrushchev's proposal about removing Nazis from all government offices. Friendly winds were blowing from the East. Eisenhower had to come up with something to scuttle the Summit.

The official history puts the reason for the failure of the Paris Summit of May 1960 on the so-called U-2 affair.

Speaker:

On 1 May 1960 a spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory. The CIA ran into severe criticism. Could not the U2 have been despatched after the Meetings, it was asked? Or did the CIA intend to deliberately provoke the Kremlin?

A secret report by Sherman Kent, CIA liaison officer to the Summit, shows that the U2 affair was not the real reason for the failure. The diplomacy of the two Great Powers in the days following the shooting clarifies the situation:

Citation:

"On 5 May Khrushchev opened the first session of a meeting of the Supreme Soviet. In his remarks he let go at the U-2 intrusion, calling it a direct provocation, and threatening retaliation. However, at the end of his speech he tempered the blast referring to his commitment to the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence and to his intention to spare no effort at the Paris meeting to reach agreement. Again, on 7 May on two occasions, one in his remarks to the adjourning Supreme Soviet and the other at an impromptu press conference, he came down hard on the "espionage" aspects of the flight and the Soviet government's sense of outrage, but said nothing to indicate that the USSR was not going through with the meeting in Paris. A few days later, 10 May, our government received the Soviet official protest which was couched without reference to the Summit. On 11 May at an exhibit of the wreckage of the U-2 aircraft in Moscow, Khrushchev again spoke with some violence, but noted only his government's intention to take the issue before the UN Security Council and, in the event of US obstruction, to the General Assembly. Nothing was said of Paris. The next day Tass glossed these remarks in such a way as to assure that the Soviet government felt that the Summit conference should take place as planned."

Speaker:

In the Cabinet meeting after his return from Paris, Eisenhower revealed:

Citation:

"It seems clear that the U2 incident was not the cause of the great switch since Mr. Khrushchev himself has spoken of knowing for so long about these U2 flights."

Author:

Khrushchev unexpectedly arrived in Paris two days before the start of the conference.

Speaker:

On 15 May, the day before the summit, he met privately with De Gaulle. What the two discussed is not known. But on the following day Khrushchev left under protest, even though the meeting was to last five days. At this time, Adolf Eichmann had already "vanished" for five days. In the night of May 15 U.S. forces let the sirens howl throughout the country. This was a threat, complained Khrushchev in a letter to US Democratic Party senators.

Author:

McCone, head of the Atomic Energy Commission and hard-liner in Eisenhower's cabinet, was against all of Khrushchev's proposals, not only against a unified and neutral Germany. He was particularly against the suspension of nuclear tests and disarmament. This would have threatened the technological superiority of the United States. McCone was concerned about the "industrial-military complex" - the state and private research centers and weapons manufactures: first and foremost: the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, a leader in the development of nuclear warheads. In his internal memo written on 17 May 1960 in Paris - as the summit had just failed:

Citation:

"Under Secretary Merchant and Ambassador Bohlen commented to the effect that despite the climate of the Summit we would continue the disarmament and test suspension negotiation at Geneva. I stated that under no circumstances should we reach the conclusion that we would continue these negotiations (...) I felt that the American public press, the Congress and some segments of the executive branch of the Government did not support continuing of test suspension with the inhibiting effect on weapons development. Messrs. Merchant and Bohlen (...) were working under a plan to cause Khrushchev, and not the President, to break off the Summit negotiations." John McCone.

Author:

If the summit had not collapsed due to the U2 affair - then what happened between the 11th and 15th May to nullify all chances of a Great Powers agreement? Khrushchev had still been full of optimism on the 11th May, as stated in the internal CIA memorandum, and on the 15th May he angrily left Paris after a meeting with De Gaulle, and did not participate in the opening of the Summit. Eichmann was caught and in custody throughout this period. The parties involved are silent about what exactly took place between the arrest on the 11th and the arrival in Israel on the 22nd May—why he only appeared at his destination 11 days later, and after the conclusion of the Paris talks. What did de Gaulle tell Khrushchev about the kidnapping of Eichmann? Did the Soviet leader reckon that a deal between Eichmann and the KGB would be made public? Had his premature arrest foiled his own plan to "transfer" the administrative organizer of mass murder—and to use him as a bargaining chip in the German question?

Many documents are obviously still secret—such as the letter of CIA Chief Dulles to Eisenhower's National Security Advisor Gordon Gray dated May 11th, 1960, the day of Eichmann's disappearance. The letter consists of two pages, is marked "Top Secret," and is in a folder titled "Eyes Only". I have requested it's release.

The State Department sent back my application for the release of this information with the note "return to sender," and again rejected my visa application without explanatory statement. I sent a questionnaire to the CIA and requested the release of several documents. The answer is still pending. I have asked the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defence Ministry in Buenos Aires for information regarding the mission of Mr. Herbert York who was sent to Argentina on 15th of May, 1960. York had already worked on the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World

War. He was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, and in 1960 director of DASA, the Defence Atomic Support Agency. Three days before his departure he had presented a list of the latest weapons systems to President Eisenhower in Cabinet. A nuclear test ban would have prevented this development. Herbert York landed in Buenos Aires on the same day that Eisenhower went to the Summit on disarmament in Paris. York was accompanied by physicists and Marines. Shortly before, and "accidentally" on the day of Eichmann's abduction, seven U.S. aircraft, three U-2 spy planes, and four bomb carriers of the type P-57, landed in Buenos Aires. And a day later, the nuclear-capable strategic bombers with air refuelling of the type KB-50 also arrived. They all remained for two days at Ezeiza-airport, and then flew together to an unknown destination. They wished to undertake test experiments, "pruebas" — as stated in the report of Argentine Military Intelligence, which I have received.

I have asked the Defence Department in Washington [for clarification on] what these "test trials" of the U.S. Atomic Agency consisted of. I am still waiting for a response.

Is, in the final analysis, this "heroic kidnapping of Eichmann by the Mossad "just a red herring?

But why raise uncomfortable questions. Have they not everyone gotten what they wanted?

The USA continued their nuclear weapons tests, and stationed their missiles on West German soil. McCone became CIA chief. They granted the Argentines a loan of 7.6 million dollars for its steel and chemical industries. Ben Gurion received from Bonn 630 million D-mark for its nuclear reactor, and on the same day on which the arrest of Eichmann was announced, the long awaited promise from Washington's about ...

Citation:

"... electronic equipment, Hawk missiles, and various items "...

Author:

... as indicated in the letter of thanks to the State Department. And something must also have been enough for the Russians to keep their silence. All parties hold tight.

The Abduction Legend or how Eichmann came to Jerusalem? A feature by Gaby Weber

You heard a co-production of Deutschlandfunk and with the Südwestfunk, 2011

Speakers were: Ursula Illert, Hüseyin Michael Cirpici, Michael and Hendrik Stickan Witte

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